Segurança

Immutable Program

A Solana program whose upgrade authority has been set to None, permanently preventing any future bytecode changes. Once a program is made immutable, its on-chain code can never be modified, providing the strongest guarantee to users that the program logic they interact with will not change. Immutability is achieved by invoking the Upgradeable BPF Loader's SetAuthority instruction with None. This is irreversible and should only be done after thorough auditing and testing.

IDimmutable-program

Leitura rápida

Comece pela explicação mais curta e útil antes de aprofundar.

A Solana program whose upgrade authority has been set to None, permanently preventing any future bytecode changes. Once a program is made immutable, its on-chain code can never be modified, providing the strongest guarantee to users that the program logic they interact with will not change. Immutability is achieved by invoking the Upgradeable BPF Loader's SetAuthority instruction with None. This is irreversible and should only be done after thorough auditing and testing.

Modelo mental

Use primeiro a analogia curta para raciocinar melhor sobre o termo quando ele aparecer em código, docs ou prompts.

Pense nisso como um bloco de construção que ajuda a ligar uma definição isolada ao sistema maior onde ela vive.

Contexto técnico

Coloque o termo dentro da camada de Solana em que ele vive para raciocinar melhor sobre ele.

Falhas, auditorias, superfícies de ataque e padrões seguros.

Por que builders ligam para isso

Transforme o termo de vocabulário em algo operacional para produto e engenharia.

Este termo destrava conceitos adjacentes rapidamente, então funciona melhor quando você o trata como um ponto de conexão, não como definição isolada.

Handoff para IA

Handoff para IA

Use este bloco compacto quando quiser dar contexto aterrado para um agente ou assistente sem despejar a página inteira.

Immutable Program (immutable-program)
Categoria: Segurança
Definição: A Solana program whose upgrade authority has been set to None, permanently preventing any future bytecode changes. Once a program is made immutable, its on-chain code can never be modified, providing the strongest guarantee to users that the program logic they interact with will not change. Immutability is achieved by invoking the Upgradeable BPF Loader's SetAuthority instruction with None. This is irreversible and should only be done after thorough auditing and testing.
Relacionados: Upgrade Authority, Upgradeable BPF Loader, Verifiable Build
Glossary Copilot

Faça perguntas de Solana com contexto aterrado sem sair do glossário.

Use contexto do glossário, relações entre termos, modelos mentais e builder paths para receber respostas estruturadas em vez de output genérico.

Explicar este código

Opcional: cole código Anchor, Solana ou Rust para o Copilot mapear primitivas de volta para termos do glossário.

Faça uma pergunta aterrada no glossário

Faça uma pergunta aterrada no glossário

O Copilot vai responder usando o termo atual, conceitos relacionados, modelos mentais e o grafo ao redor do glossário.

Grafo conceitual

Veja o termo como parte de uma rede, não como uma definição sem saída.

Esses ramos mostram quais conceitos esse termo toca diretamente e o que existe uma camada além deles.

Ramo

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Ramo

Upgradeable BPF Loader

The current BPF Loader (BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e111...) that supports deploying and upgrading programs. It creates three accounts: the program account (thin proxy with executable flag), the program data account (holds the actual ELF bytecode), and records the upgrade authority. Programs can be made immutable by setting the authority to None.

Ramo

Verifiable Build

A reproducible build process that proves deployed on-chain program bytecode was compiled from specific public source code. Tools like solana-verify use Docker containers with pinned toolchain versions to produce deterministic ELF binaries, then compare the hash of the build artifact against the deployed program data account. Verified programs are displayed with a checkmark on Solana Explorer and OtterSec's registry, increasing user trust that the running code matches the audited source.

Próximos conceitos para explorar

Continue a cadeia de aprendizado em vez de parar em uma única definição.

Estes são os próximos conceitos que valem abrir se você quiser que este termo faça mais sentido dentro de um workflow real de Solana.

Modelo de Programação

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Modelo de Programação

Upgradeable BPF Loader

The current BPF Loader (BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e111...) that supports deploying and upgrading programs. It creates three accounts: the program account (thin proxy with executable flag), the program data account (holds the actual ELF bytecode), and records the upgrade authority. Programs can be made immutable by setting the authority to None.

Segurança

Verifiable Build

A reproducible build process that proves deployed on-chain program bytecode was compiled from specific public source code. Tools like solana-verify use Docker containers with pinned toolchain versions to produce deterministic ELF binaries, then compare the hash of the build artifact against the deployed program data account. Verified programs are displayed with a checkmark on Solana Explorer and OtterSec's registry, increasing user trust that the running code matches the audited source.

Segurança

Instruction Ordering Attack

Exploit where an attacker crafts a transaction with instructions in a specific order to manipulate program state between instructions within the same transaction. Since Solana executes all instructions in a transaction sequentially, earlier instructions can modify account state that later instructions depend on, enabling unexpected state transitions.

Termos relacionados

Siga os conceitos que realmente dão contexto a este termo.

Entradas de glossário só ficam úteis quando estão conectadas. Esses links são o caminho mais curto para ideias adjacentes.

Modelo de Programaçãoupgrade-authority

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Modelo de Programaçãoupgradeable-loader

Upgradeable BPF Loader

The current BPF Loader (BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e111...) that supports deploying and upgrading programs. It creates three accounts: the program account (thin proxy with executable flag), the program data account (holds the actual ELF bytecode), and records the upgrade authority. Programs can be made immutable by setting the authority to None.

Segurançaverifiable-build

Verifiable Build

A reproducible build process that proves deployed on-chain program bytecode was compiled from specific public source code. Tools like solana-verify use Docker containers with pinned toolchain versions to produce deterministic ELF binaries, then compare the hash of the build artifact against the deployed program data account. Verified programs are displayed with a checkmark on Solana Explorer and OtterSec's registry, increasing user trust that the running code matches the audited source.

Mais na categoria

Permaneça na mesma camada e continue construindo contexto.

Essas entradas vivem ao lado do termo atual e ajudam a página a parecer parte de um grafo maior, não um beco sem saída.

Segurança

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Segurança

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Segurança

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Segurança

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.