Seguridad

Immutable Program

A Solana program whose upgrade authority has been set to None, permanently preventing any future bytecode changes. Once a program is made immutable, its on-chain code can never be modified, providing the strongest guarantee to users that the program logic they interact with will not change. Immutability is achieved by invoking the Upgradeable BPF Loader's SetAuthority instruction with None. This is irreversible and should only be done after thorough auditing and testing.

IDimmutable-program

Lectura rápida

Empieza por la explicación más corta y útil antes de profundizar.

A Solana program whose upgrade authority has been set to None, permanently preventing any future bytecode changes. Once a program is made immutable, its on-chain code can never be modified, providing the strongest guarantee to users that the program logic they interact with will not change. Immutability is achieved by invoking the Upgradeable BPF Loader's SetAuthority instruction with None. This is irreversible and should only be done after thorough auditing and testing.

Modelo mental

Usa primero la analogía corta para razonar mejor sobre el término cuando aparezca en código, docs o prompts.

Piensa en esto como un bloque de construcción que conecta una definición aislada con el sistema mayor donde vive.

Contexto técnico

Ubica el término dentro de la capa de Solana en la que vive para razonar mejor sobre él.

Fallos, auditorías, superficies de ataque y patrones seguros.

Por qué le importa a un builder

Convierte el término de vocabulario en algo operacional para producto e ingeniería.

Este término desbloquea conceptos adyacentes rápido, así que funciona mejor cuando lo tratas como un punto de conexión y no como una definición aislada.

Handoff para IA

Handoff para IA

Usa este bloque compacto cuando quieras dar contexto sólido a un agente o asistente sin volcar toda la página.

Immutable Program (immutable-program)
Categoría: Seguridad
Definición: A Solana program whose upgrade authority has been set to None, permanently preventing any future bytecode changes. Once a program is made immutable, its on-chain code can never be modified, providing the strongest guarantee to users that the program logic they interact with will not change. Immutability is achieved by invoking the Upgradeable BPF Loader's SetAuthority instruction with None. This is irreversible and should only be done after thorough auditing and testing.
Relacionados: Upgrade Authority, Upgradeable BPF Loader, Verifiable Build
Glossary Copilot

Haz preguntas de Solana con contexto aterrizado sin salir del glosario.

Usa contexto del glosario, relaciones entre términos, modelos mentales y builder paths para recibir respuestas estructuradas en vez de output genérico.

Abrir workspace completa del Copilot
Explicar este código

Opcional: pega código Anchor, Solana o Rust para que el Copilot mapee primitivas de vuelta al glosario.

Haz una pregunta aterrizada en el glosario

Haz una pregunta aterrizada en el glosario

El Copilot responderá usando el término actual, conceptos relacionados, modelos mentales y el grafo alrededor del glosario.

Grafo conceptual

Ve el término como parte de una red, no como una definición aislada.

Estas ramas muestran qué conceptos toca este término directamente y qué existe una capa más allá de ellos.

Rama

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Rama

Upgradeable BPF Loader

The current BPF Loader (BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e111...) that supports deploying and upgrading programs. It creates three accounts: the program account (thin proxy with executable flag), the program data account (holds the actual ELF bytecode), and records the upgrade authority. Programs can be made immutable by setting the authority to None.

Rama

Verifiable Build

A reproducible build process that proves deployed on-chain program bytecode was compiled from specific public source code. Tools like solana-verify use Docker containers with pinned toolchain versions to produce deterministic ELF binaries, then compare the hash of the build artifact against the deployed program data account. Verified programs are displayed with a checkmark on Solana Explorer and OtterSec's registry, increasing user trust that the running code matches the audited source.

Siguientes conceptos para explorar

Mantén la cadena de aprendizaje en movimiento en lugar de parar en una sola definición.

Estos son los siguientes conceptos que vale la pena abrir si quieres que este término tenga más sentido dentro de un workflow real de Solana.

Modelo de Programación

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Modelo de Programación

Upgradeable BPF Loader

The current BPF Loader (BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e111...) that supports deploying and upgrading programs. It creates three accounts: the program account (thin proxy with executable flag), the program data account (holds the actual ELF bytecode), and records the upgrade authority. Programs can be made immutable by setting the authority to None.

Seguridad

Verifiable Build

A reproducible build process that proves deployed on-chain program bytecode was compiled from specific public source code. Tools like solana-verify use Docker containers with pinned toolchain versions to produce deterministic ELF binaries, then compare the hash of the build artifact against the deployed program data account. Verified programs are displayed with a checkmark on Solana Explorer and OtterSec's registry, increasing user trust that the running code matches the audited source.

Seguridad

Instruction Ordering Attack

Exploit where an attacker crafts a transaction with instructions in a specific order to manipulate program state between instructions within the same transaction. Since Solana executes all instructions in a transaction sequentially, earlier instructions can modify account state that later instructions depend on, enabling unexpected state transitions.

Términos relacionados

Sigue los conceptos que realmente le dan contexto a este término.

Las entradas del glosario se vuelven útiles cuando están conectadas. Estos enlaces son el camino más corto hacia ideas adyacentes.

Modelo de Programaciónupgrade-authority

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Modelo de Programaciónupgradeable-loader

Upgradeable BPF Loader

The current BPF Loader (BPFLoaderUpgradeab1e111...) that supports deploying and upgrading programs. It creates three accounts: the program account (thin proxy with executable flag), the program data account (holds the actual ELF bytecode), and records the upgrade authority. Programs can be made immutable by setting the authority to None.

Seguridadverifiable-build

Verifiable Build

A reproducible build process that proves deployed on-chain program bytecode was compiled from specific public source code. Tools like solana-verify use Docker containers with pinned toolchain versions to produce deterministic ELF binaries, then compare the hash of the build artifact against the deployed program data account. Verified programs are displayed with a checkmark on Solana Explorer and OtterSec's registry, increasing user trust that the running code matches the audited source.

Más en la categoría

Quédate en la misma capa y sigue construyendo contexto.

Estas entradas viven junto al término actual y ayudan a que la página se sienta parte de un grafo de conocimiento más amplio en lugar de un callejón sin salida.

Seguridad

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Seguridad

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Seguridad

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Seguridad

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.