Seguridad

Type Cosplay

A vulnerability, also called account confusion, where a program deserializes an account as type A when it actually contains data for type B because both structs happen to share a compatible byte layout at the fields the program checks, enabling an attacker to substitute one account type for another to satisfy access control or arithmetic that assumes a specific type. Anchor prevents this by prepending an 8-byte discriminator (the first 8 bytes of the SHA-256 hash of the fully-qualified type name) to every account during initialization and asserting it on every subsequent access; native programs must implement equivalent discriminator logic manually.

IDtype-cosplay

Lectura rápida

Empieza por la explicación más corta y útil antes de profundizar.

A vulnerability, also called account confusion, where a program deserializes an account as type A when it actually contains data for type B because both structs happen to share a compatible byte layout at the fields the program checks, enabling an attacker to substitute one account type for another to satisfy access control or arithmetic that assumes a specific type. Anchor prevents this by prepending an 8-byte discriminator (the first 8 bytes of the SHA-256 hash of the fully-qualified type name) to every account during initialization and asserting it on every subsequent access; native programs must implement equivalent discriminator logic manually.

Modelo mental

Usa primero la analogía corta para razonar mejor sobre el término cuando aparezca en código, docs o prompts.

Piensa en esto como un bloque de construcción que conecta una definición aislada con el sistema mayor donde vive.

Contexto técnico

Ubica el término dentro de la capa de Solana en la que vive para razonar mejor sobre él.

Fallos, auditorías, superficies de ataque y patrones seguros.

Por qué le importa a un builder

Convierte el término de vocabulario en algo operacional para producto e ingeniería.

Este término desbloquea conceptos adyacentes rápido, así que funciona mejor cuando lo tratas como un punto de conexión y no como una definición aislada.

Handoff para IA

Handoff para IA

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Type Cosplay (type-cosplay)
Categoría: Seguridad
Definición: A vulnerability, also called account confusion, where a program deserializes an account as type A when it actually contains data for type B because both structs happen to share a compatible byte layout at the fields the program checks, enabling an attacker to substitute one account type for another to satisfy access control or arithmetic that assumes a specific type. Anchor prevents this by prepending an 8-byte discriminator (the first 8 bytes of the SHA-256 hash of the fully-qualified type name) to every account during initialization and asserting it on every subsequent access; native programs must implement equivalent discriminator logic manually.
Relacionados: Discriminador, Account Data
Glossary Copilot

Haz preguntas de Solana con contexto aterrizado sin salir del glosario.

Usa contexto del glosario, relaciones entre términos, modelos mentales y builder paths para recibir respuestas estructuradas en vez de output genérico.

Abrir workspace completa del Copilot
Explicar este código

Opcional: pega código Anchor, Solana o Rust para que el Copilot mapee primitivas de vuelta al glosario.

Haz una pregunta aterrizada en el glosario

Haz una pregunta aterrizada en el glosario

El Copilot responderá usando el término actual, conceptos relacionados, modelos mentales y el grafo alrededor del glosario.

Grafo conceptual

Ve el término como parte de una red, no como una definición aislada.

Estas ramas muestran qué conceptos toca este término directamente y qué existe una capa más allá de ellos.

Rama

Discriminador

An 8-byte identifier prepended to account data and instruction data to distinguish types. Anchor computes it as the first 8 bytes of `sha256('account:<AccountName>')` for accounts and `sha256('global:<function_name>')` for instructions. Discriminators prevent type cosplay attacks by ensuring data is deserialized as the correct type.

Rama

Account Data

The byte array stored in an account that holds program-specific state. Data is typically serialized using Borsh and must be explicitly allocated at account creation. The maximum data size is 10MB. Programs are responsible for defining and managing their own data layout, including discriminators for type identification.

Siguientes conceptos para explorar

Mantén la cadena de aprendizaje en movimiento en lugar de parar en una sola definición.

Estos son los siguientes conceptos que vale la pena abrir si quieres que este término tenga más sentido dentro de un workflow real de Solana.

Modelo de Programación

Discriminador

An 8-byte identifier prepended to account data and instruction data to distinguish types. Anchor computes it as the first 8 bytes of `sha256('account:<AccountName>')` for accounts and `sha256('global:<function_name>')` for instructions. Discriminators prevent type cosplay attacks by ensuring data is deserialized as the correct type.

Modelo de Programación

Account Data

The byte array stored in an account that holds program-specific state. Data is typically serialized using Borsh and must be explicitly allocated at account creation. The maximum data size is 10MB. Programs are responsible for defining and managing their own data layout, including discriminators for type identification.

Seguridad

Unsafe Deserialization

A vulnerability where account data is deserialized into a Rust struct without validating that the data length, discriminator, or content matches expectations, potentially allowing an attacker to craft maliciously structured account bytes that cause undefined behavior, skip field initialization, or be misinterpreted as a different struct type. In Solana programs, using try_from_slice on data that is shorter than the expected struct silently succeeds in some configurations (or panics in others), leaving fields zeroed or corrupted. The safe pattern is to always validate the discriminator prefix, use try_from_slice_unchecked only when bounds are independently guaranteed, and leverage Anchor's automatic discriminator enforcement on Account<'info, T> deserialization.

Seguridad

Time-Lock

A security mechanism that enforces a mandatory delay between proposing a privileged action (such as a program upgrade, treasury withdrawal, or parameter change) and its execution. Time-locks give stakeholders and users a window to review pending actions, detect malicious proposals, and exit the protocol if needed. On Solana, time-locks are typically implemented through multisig programs like Squads or governance frameworks that queue transactions for a configurable delay period before they become executable.

Términos relacionados

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Las entradas del glosario se vuelven útiles cuando están conectadas. Estos enlaces son el camino más corto hacia ideas adyacentes.

Modelo de Programacióndiscriminator

Discriminador

An 8-byte identifier prepended to account data and instruction data to distinguish types. Anchor computes it as the first 8 bytes of `sha256('account:<AccountName>')` for accounts and `sha256('global:<function_name>')` for instructions. Discriminators prevent type cosplay attacks by ensuring data is deserialized as the correct type.

Modelo de Programaciónaccount-data

Account Data

The byte array stored in an account that holds program-specific state. Data is typically serialized using Borsh and must be explicitly allocated at account creation. The maximum data size is 10MB. Programs are responsible for defining and managing their own data layout, including discriminators for type identification.

Más en la categoría

Quédate en la misma capa y sigue construyendo contexto.

Estas entradas viven junto al término actual y ayudan a que la página se sienta parte de un grafo de conocimiento más amplio en lugar de un callejón sin salida.

Seguridad

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Seguridad

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Seguridad

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Seguridad

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.