Seguridad

Time-Lock

A security mechanism that enforces a mandatory delay between proposing a privileged action (such as a program upgrade, treasury withdrawal, or parameter change) and its execution. Time-locks give stakeholders and users a window to review pending actions, detect malicious proposals, and exit the protocol if needed. On Solana, time-locks are typically implemented through multisig programs like Squads or governance frameworks that queue transactions for a configurable delay period before they become executable.

IDtime-lock-security

Lectura rápida

Empieza por la explicación más corta y útil antes de profundizar.

A security mechanism that enforces a mandatory delay between proposing a privileged action (such as a program upgrade, treasury withdrawal, or parameter change) and its execution. Time-locks give stakeholders and users a window to review pending actions, detect malicious proposals, and exit the protocol if needed. On Solana, time-locks are typically implemented through multisig programs like Squads or governance frameworks that queue transactions for a configurable delay period before they become executable.

Modelo mental

Usa primero la analogía corta para razonar mejor sobre el término cuando aparezca en código, docs o prompts.

Piensa en esto como un bloque de construcción que conecta una definición aislada con el sistema mayor donde vive.

Contexto técnico

Ubica el término dentro de la capa de Solana en la que vive para razonar mejor sobre él.

Fallos, auditorías, superficies de ataque y patrones seguros.

Por qué le importa a un builder

Convierte el término de vocabulario en algo operacional para producto e ingeniería.

Este término desbloquea conceptos adyacentes rápido, así que funciona mejor cuando lo tratas como un punto de conexión y no como una definición aislada.

Handoff para IA

Handoff para IA

Usa este bloque compacto cuando quieras dar contexto sólido a un agente o asistente sin volcar toda la página.

Time-Lock (time-lock-security)
Categoría: Seguridad
Definición: A security mechanism that enforces a mandatory delay between proposing a privileged action (such as a program upgrade, treasury withdrawal, or parameter change) and its execution. Time-locks give stakeholders and users a window to review pending actions, detect malicious proposals, and exit the protocol if needed. On Solana, time-locks are typically implemented through multisig programs like Squads or governance frameworks that queue transactions for a configurable delay period before they become executable.
Relacionados: Squads (Multisig), Multisig, Upgrade Authority
Glossary Copilot

Haz preguntas de Solana con contexto aterrizado sin salir del glosario.

Usa contexto del glosario, relaciones entre términos, modelos mentales y builder paths para recibir respuestas estructuradas en vez de output genérico.

Abrir workspace completa del Copilot
Explicar este código

Opcional: pega código Anchor, Solana o Rust para que el Copilot mapee primitivas de vuelta al glosario.

Haz una pregunta aterrizada en el glosario

Haz una pregunta aterrizada en el glosario

El Copilot responderá usando el término actual, conceptos relacionados, modelos mentales y el grafo alrededor del glosario.

Grafo conceptual

Ve el término como parte de una red, no como una definición aislada.

Estas ramas muestran qué conceptos toca este término directamente y qué existe una capa más allá de ellos.

Rama

Squads (Multisig)

A multisig protocol on Solana (Squads v3/v4) enabling M-of-N approval for transactions. Used to manage program upgrade authorities, treasury wallets, and DAO operations. Squads creates a multisig PDA that acts as the authority; members propose transactions that execute once the threshold is reached. Critical for production program security.

Rama

Multisig

An account controlled by multiple parties requiring M-of-N signatures to authorize actions. On Solana, multisig is implemented by programs like Squads rather than at the protocol level. Use cases: program upgrade authority (require 3-of-5 team members), treasury management, and DAO governance execution.

Rama

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Siguientes conceptos para explorar

Mantén la cadena de aprendizaje en movimiento en lugar de parar en una sola definición.

Estos son los siguientes conceptos que vale la pena abrir si quieres que este término tenga más sentido dentro de un workflow real de Solana.

Herramientas de Dev

Squads (Multisig)

A multisig protocol on Solana (Squads v3/v4) enabling M-of-N approval for transactions. Used to manage program upgrade authorities, treasury wallets, and DAO operations. Squads creates a multisig PDA that acts as the authority; members propose transactions that execute once the threshold is reached. Critical for production program security.

Herramientas de Dev

Multisig

An account controlled by multiple parties requiring M-of-N signatures to authorize actions. On Solana, multisig is implemented by programs like Squads rather than at the protocol level. Use cases: program upgrade authority (require 3-of-5 team members), treasury management, and DAO governance execution.

Modelo de Programación

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Seguridad

Type Cosplay

A vulnerability, also called account confusion, where a program deserializes an account as type A when it actually contains data for type B because both structs happen to share a compatible byte layout at the fields the program checks, enabling an attacker to substitute one account type for another to satisfy access control or arithmetic that assumes a specific type. Anchor prevents this by prepending an 8-byte discriminator (the first 8 bytes of the SHA-256 hash of the fully-qualified type name) to every account during initialization and asserting it on every subsequent access; native programs must implement equivalent discriminator logic manually.

Términos relacionados

Sigue los conceptos que realmente le dan contexto a este término.

Las entradas del glosario se vuelven útiles cuando están conectadas. Estos enlaces son el camino más corto hacia ideas adyacentes.

Herramientas de Devsquads

Squads (Multisig)

A multisig protocol on Solana (Squads v3/v4) enabling M-of-N approval for transactions. Used to manage program upgrade authorities, treasury wallets, and DAO operations. Squads creates a multisig PDA that acts as the authority; members propose transactions that execute once the threshold is reached. Critical for production program security.

Herramientas de Devmultisig

Multisig

An account controlled by multiple parties requiring M-of-N signatures to authorize actions. On Solana, multisig is implemented by programs like Squads rather than at the protocol level. Use cases: program upgrade authority (require 3-of-5 team members), treasury management, and DAO governance execution.

Modelo de Programaciónupgrade-authority

Upgrade Authority

The pubkey authorized to upgrade a program's bytecode via the Upgradeable BPF Loader. Only the upgrade authority can deploy new bytecode to the program data account. Setting the upgrade authority to None makes the program immutable. Multisig (e.g., Squads) is commonly used to manage upgrade authority for production programs.

Más en la categoría

Quédate en la misma capa y sigue construyendo contexto.

Estas entradas viven junto al término actual y ayudan a que la página se sienta parte de un grafo de conocimiento más amplio en lugar de un callejón sin salida.

Seguridad

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Seguridad

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Seguridad

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Seguridad

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.