Segurança

Sysvar Spoofing

A vulnerability where a program retrieves a sysvar (such as Clock, Rent, or SlotHashes) by deserializing an account passed in the instruction's account list rather than using the runtime's native sysvar access API, allowing an attacker to substitute a fake account at the well-known sysvar address with crafted data — for example, a manipulated clock timestamp to bypass time locks. The safe pattern in modern Solana programs is to use Clock::get(), Rent::get(), and equivalent intrinsics that read from the runtime directly without trusting any account; Anchor's Sysvar<'info, Clock> account type validates the address but native programs should prefer the get() API.

IDsysvar-spoofing

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A vulnerability where a program retrieves a sysvar (such as Clock, Rent, or SlotHashes) by deserializing an account passed in the instruction's account list rather than using the runtime's native sysvar access API, allowing an attacker to substitute a fake account at the well-known sysvar address with crafted data — for example, a manipulated clock timestamp to bypass time locks. The safe pattern in modern Solana programs is to use Clock::get(), Rent::get(), and equivalent intrinsics that read from the runtime directly without trusting any account; Anchor's Sysvar<'info, Clock> account type validates the address but native programs should prefer the get() API.

Modelo mental

Use primeiro a analogia curta para raciocinar melhor sobre o termo quando ele aparecer em código, docs ou prompts.

Pense nisso como um bloco de construção que ajuda a ligar uma definição isolada ao sistema maior onde ela vive.

Contexto técnico

Coloque o termo dentro da camada de Solana em que ele vive para raciocinar melhor sobre ele.

Falhas, auditorias, superfícies de ataque e padrões seguros.

Por que builders ligam para isso

Transforme o termo de vocabulário em algo operacional para produto e engenharia.

Este termo destrava conceitos adjacentes rapidamente, então funciona melhor quando você o trata como um ponto de conexão, não como definição isolada.

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Handoff para IA

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Sysvar Spoofing (sysvar-spoofing)
Categoria: Segurança
Definição: A vulnerability where a program retrieves a sysvar (such as Clock, Rent, or SlotHashes) by deserializing an account passed in the instruction's account list rather than using the runtime's native sysvar access API, allowing an attacker to substitute a fake account at the well-known sysvar address with crafted data — for example, a manipulated clock timestamp to bypass time locks. The safe pattern in modern Solana programs is to use Clock::get(), Rent::get(), and equivalent intrinsics that read from the runtime directly without trusting any account; Anchor's Sysvar<'info, Clock> account type validates the address but native programs should prefer the get() API.
Relacionados: Sysvar, Clock Sysvar
Glossary Copilot

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Use contexto do glossário, relações entre termos, modelos mentais e builder paths para receber respostas estruturadas em vez de output genérico.

Explicar este código

Opcional: cole código Anchor, Solana ou Rust para o Copilot mapear primitivas de volta para termos do glossário.

Faça uma pergunta aterrada no glossário

Faça uma pergunta aterrada no glossário

O Copilot vai responder usando o termo atual, conceitos relacionados, modelos mentais e o grafo ao redor do glossário.

Grafo conceitual

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Esses ramos mostram quais conceitos esse termo toca diretamente e o que existe uma camada além deles.

Ramo

Sysvar

Special read-only accounts maintained by the runtime that expose cluster state to programs. Key sysvars include Clock (slot, timestamp), Rent (lamports-per-byte), EpochSchedule (epoch parameters), RecentBlockhashes, StakeHistory, and Fees. Programs access sysvars by including the sysvar account in the instruction or via the sol_get_sysvar syscall.

Ramo

Clock Sysvar

A sysvar (address: SysvarC1ock11111111111111111111111111111111) that provides the current slot, epoch, unix_timestamp, and leader_schedule_epoch. Programs use Clock to implement time-based logic like lockups or vesting schedules. In Anchor, accessed via `Clock::get()` or as a sysvar account in the accounts struct.

Próximos conceitos para explorar

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Estes são os próximos conceitos que valem abrir se você quiser que este termo faça mais sentido dentro de um workflow real de Solana.

Modelo de Programação

Sysvar

Special read-only accounts maintained by the runtime that expose cluster state to programs. Key sysvars include Clock (slot, timestamp), Rent (lamports-per-byte), EpochSchedule (epoch parameters), RecentBlockhashes, StakeHistory, and Fees. Programs access sysvars by including the sysvar account in the instruction or via the sol_get_sysvar syscall.

Modelo de Programação

Clock Sysvar

A sysvar (address: SysvarC1ock11111111111111111111111111111111) that provides the current slot, epoch, unix_timestamp, and leader_schedule_epoch. Programs use Clock to implement time-based logic like lockups or vesting schedules. In Anchor, accessed via `Clock::get()` or as a sysvar account in the accounts struct.

Segurança

Time-Lock

A security mechanism that enforces a mandatory delay between proposing a privileged action (such as a program upgrade, treasury withdrawal, or parameter change) and its execution. Time-locks give stakeholders and users a window to review pending actions, detect malicious proposals, and exit the protocol if needed. On Solana, time-locks are typically implemented through multisig programs like Squads or governance frameworks that queue transactions for a configurable delay period before they become executable.

Segurança

Stateful Fuzzing

An advanced fuzzing technique that maintains program state across iterations, generating sequences of instructions rather than individual random inputs. Stateful fuzzing can discover vulnerabilities that only manifest after specific sequences of operations, such as a withdraw-after-close or a double-init attack. Trident implements stateful fuzzing for Solana programs by maintaining a simulated runtime state and generating random instruction sequences with valid account configurations derived from the program's Anchor IDL.

Termos relacionados

Siga os conceitos que realmente dão contexto a este termo.

Entradas de glossário só ficam úteis quando estão conectadas. Esses links são o caminho mais curto para ideias adjacentes.

Modelo de Programaçãosysvar

Sysvar

Special read-only accounts maintained by the runtime that expose cluster state to programs. Key sysvars include Clock (slot, timestamp), Rent (lamports-per-byte), EpochSchedule (epoch parameters), RecentBlockhashes, StakeHistory, and Fees. Programs access sysvars by including the sysvar account in the instruction or via the sol_get_sysvar syscall.

Modelo de Programaçãoclock

Clock Sysvar

A sysvar (address: SysvarC1ock11111111111111111111111111111111) that provides the current slot, epoch, unix_timestamp, and leader_schedule_epoch. Programs use Clock to implement time-based logic like lockups or vesting schedules. In Anchor, accessed via `Clock::get()` or as a sysvar account in the accounts struct.

Mais na categoria

Permaneça na mesma camada e continue construindo contexto.

Essas entradas vivem ao lado do termo atual e ajudam a página a parecer parte de um grafo maior, não um beco sem saída.

Segurança

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Segurança

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Segurança

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Segurança

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.