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Segurança

Account Revival Attack

An exploit that resurrects an account that a program has logically closed within the same transaction by sending lamports back to it before the transaction finalizes, causing its on-chain data — which was never securely wiped — to re-appear as a funded, seemingly valid account in future transactions. Because the Solana runtime keeps an account alive as long as it holds any lamports, transferring even 1 lamport back to a closed-but-not-wiped account prevents its deletion and allows an attacker to reuse its stale state. The defense is to explicitly overwrite account data with a closed discriminator and to use force-defund patterns so any lamports transferred in during the same transaction are immediately drained.

IDrevival-attack
Leitura rápida

Leitura rápida

Comece pela explicação mais curta e útil antes de aprofundar.

An exploit that resurrects an account that a program has logically closed within the same transaction by sending lamports back to it before the transaction finalizes, causing its on-chain data — which was never securely wiped — to re-appear as a funded, seemingly valid account in future transactions. Because the Solana runtime keeps an account alive as long as it holds any lamports, transferring even 1 lamport back to a closed-but-not-wiped account prevents its deletion and allows an attacker to reuse its stale state. The defense is to explicitly overwrite account data with a closed discriminator and to use force-defund patterns so any lamports transferred in during the same transaction are immediately drained.

Modelo mental

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Por que builders ligam para isso

Por que builders ligam para isso

Transforme o termo de vocabulário em algo operacional para produto e engenharia.

Este termo destrava conceitos adjacentes rapidamente, então funciona melhor quando você o trata como um ponto de conexão, não como definição isolada.

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Account Revival Attack (revival-attack)
Categoria: Segurança
Definição: An exploit that resurrects an account that a program has logically closed within the same transaction by sending lamports back to it before the transaction finalizes, causing its on-chain data — which was never securely wiped — to re-appear as a funded, seemingly valid account in future transactions. Because the Solana runtime keeps an account alive as long as it holds any lamports, transferring even 1 lamport back to a closed-but-not-wiped account prevents its deletion and allows an attacker to reuse its stale state. The defense is to explicitly overwrite account data with a closed discriminator and to use force-defund patterns so any lamports transferred in during the same transaction are immediately drained.
Relacionados: Closing Accounts Vulnerability, Close Account
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Grafo conceitual

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Esses ramos mostram quais conceitos esse termo toca diretamente e o que existe uma camada além deles.

Ramo

Closing Accounts Vulnerability

A vulnerability that arises when a program closes an account by zeroing its data and transferring lamports without setting the account's discriminator or data to a sentinel closed state before the end of the instruction, leaving a window within the same transaction where other instructions can still interact with the now-empty account. The Solana runtime only removes an account from the account set when its lamports reach zero at the end of a transaction, so mid-transaction the account still exists and a subsequent instruction can re-fund it and reinstate stale data, enabling an account revival attack. Anchor's close constraint writes a CLOSED_ACCOUNT_DISCRIMINATOR (8 bytes of 0xff) and uses a force-defund mechanism to prevent resurrection.

Aluguel (Rent)
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Ramo

Close Account

The process of reclaiming an account's lamports and marking it for deletion. To close an account: transfer all lamports to a recipient, zero out the data, and (in Anchor) set the discriminator to a closed sentinel. The runtime garbage-collects zero-lamport accounts. Failing to zero data enables revival attacks.

LamportConta
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Próximos conceitos para explorar

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Estes são os próximos conceitos que valem abrir se você quiser que este termo faça mais sentido dentro de um workflow real de Solana.

Segurança

Closing Accounts Vulnerability

A vulnerability that arises when a program closes an account by zeroing its data and transferring lamports without setting the account's discriminator or data to a sentinel closed state before the end of the instruction, leaving a window within the same transaction where other instructions can still interact with the now-empty account. The Solana runtime only removes an account from the account set when its lamports reach zero at the end of a transaction, so mid-transaction the account still exists and a subsequent instruction can re-fund it and reinstate stale data, enabling an account revival attack. Anchor's close constraint writes a CLOSED_ACCOUNT_DISCRIMINATOR (8 bytes of 0xff) and uses a force-defund mechanism to prevent resurrection.

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Modelo de Programação

Close Account

The process of reclaiming an account's lamports and marking it for deletion. To close an account: transfer all lamports to a recipient, zero out the data, and (in Anchor) set the discriminator to a closed sentinel. The runtime garbage-collects zero-lamport accounts. Failing to zero data enables revival attacks.

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Segurança

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

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Segurança

Account Reloading Attack

A vulnerability in Anchor programs where a program reads an account's data before making a CPI call, the CPI modifies that account's lamports or data, but the program continues using the stale pre-CPI snapshot instead of reloading the account from the runtime. In Anchor, after a CPI the account reference still holds the pre-call data unless account.reload() is explicitly called, meaning balance checks, state assertions, or further computation can operate on incorrect values. Attackers can exploit this to pass checks using an initial account state that the CPI subsequently invalidates.

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Comumente confundido com

Termos próximos em vocabulário, sigla ou vizinhança conceitual.

Essas entradas são fáceis de misturar quando você lê rápido, faz prompting em um LLM ou está entrando em uma nova camada de Solana.

Segurançaaccount-reloading

Account Reloading Attack

A vulnerability in Anchor programs where a program reads an account's data before making a CPI call, the CPI modifies that account's lamports or data, but the program continues using the stale pre-CPI snapshot instead of reloading the account from the runtime. In Anchor, after a CPI the account reference still holds the pre-call data unless account.reload() is explicitly called, meaning balance checks, state assertions, or further computation can operate on incorrect values. Attackers can exploit this to pass checks using an initial account state that the CPI subsequently invalidates.

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Segurançaflash-loan-attack

Flash Loan Attack

An exploit where an attacker borrows a large amount of tokens via an uncollateralized flash loan, uses the borrowed funds to manipulate protocol state (typically distorting oracle prices or satisfying collateral requirements), extracts profit from the manipulated state, and repays the loan — all within a single atomic transaction. On Solana, flash loans are possible because transactions are atomic: if any instruction fails, the entire transaction reverts including the loan. Defenses include using time-weighted oracle prices, enforcing borrowing caps, and requiring multi-slot settlement.

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Segurançainstruction-ordering-attack

Instruction Ordering Attack

Exploit where an attacker crafts a transaction with instructions in a specific order to manipulate program state between instructions within the same transaction. Since Solana executes all instructions in a transaction sequentially, earlier instructions can modify account state that later instructions depend on, enabling unexpected state transitions.

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Termos relacionados

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Entradas de glossário só ficam úteis quando estão conectadas. Esses links são o caminho mais curto para ideias adjacentes.

Segurançaclosing-accounts

Closing Accounts Vulnerability

A vulnerability that arises when a program closes an account by zeroing its data and transferring lamports without setting the account's discriminator or data to a sentinel closed state before the end of the instruction, leaving a window within the same transaction where other instructions can still interact with the now-empty account. The Solana runtime only removes an account from the account set when its lamports reach zero at the end of a transaction, so mid-transaction the account still exists and a subsequent instruction can re-fund it and reinstate stale data, enabling an account revival attack. Anchor's close constraint writes a CLOSED_ACCOUNT_DISCRIMINATOR (8 bytes of 0xff) and uses a force-defund mechanism to prevent resurrection.

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Modelo de Programaçãoclose-account

Close Account

The process of reclaiming an account's lamports and marking it for deletion. To close an account: transfer all lamports to a recipient, zero out the data, and (in Anchor) set the discriminator to a closed sentinel. The runtime garbage-collects zero-lamport accounts. Failing to zero data enables revival attacks.

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Mais na categoria

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Segurança

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

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Segurança

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

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Segurança

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

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Segurança

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.

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