Segurança

Front-Running

An attack where an adversary observes a pending or not-yet-finalized transaction (e.g., a large swap or NFT mint) and submits a competing transaction with higher priority fees or via validator relationships to execute before the victim's transaction, profiting from predictable price impact. On Solana, transactions are not held in a public mempool the same way as in Ethereum — leaders receive transactions privately — but front-running is still possible through Jito's block engine bundle mechanism, validator collusion, or by monitoring gossip. Slippage tolerance parameters and commit-reveal schemes are the primary application-level defenses.

IDfront-running

Leitura rápida

Comece pela explicação mais curta e útil antes de aprofundar.

An attack where an adversary observes a pending or not-yet-finalized transaction (e.g., a large swap or NFT mint) and submits a competing transaction with higher priority fees or via validator relationships to execute before the victim's transaction, profiting from predictable price impact. On Solana, transactions are not held in a public mempool the same way as in Ethereum — leaders receive transactions privately — but front-running is still possible through Jito's block engine bundle mechanism, validator collusion, or by monitoring gossip. Slippage tolerance parameters and commit-reveal schemes are the primary application-level defenses.

Modelo mental

Use primeiro a analogia curta para raciocinar melhor sobre o termo quando ele aparecer em código, docs ou prompts.

Pense nisso como um bloco de construção que ajuda a ligar uma definição isolada ao sistema maior onde ela vive.

Contexto técnico

Coloque o termo dentro da camada de Solana em que ele vive para raciocinar melhor sobre ele.

Falhas, auditorias, superfícies de ataque e padrões seguros.

Por que builders ligam para isso

Transforme o termo de vocabulário em algo operacional para produto e engenharia.

Este termo destrava conceitos adjacentes rapidamente, então funciona melhor quando você o trata como um ponto de conexão, não como definição isolada.

Handoff para IA

Handoff para IA

Use este bloco compacto quando quiser dar contexto aterrado para um agente ou assistente sem despejar a página inteira.

Front-Running (front-running)
Categoria: Segurança
Definição: An attack where an adversary observes a pending or not-yet-finalized transaction (e.g., a large swap or NFT mint) and submits a competing transaction with higher priority fees or via validator relationships to execute before the victim's transaction, profiting from predictable price impact. On Solana, transactions are not held in a public mempool the same way as in Ethereum — leaders receive transactions privately — but front-running is still possible through Jito's block engine bundle mechanism, validator collusion, or by monitoring gossip. Slippage tolerance parameters and commit-reveal schemes are the primary application-level defenses.
Relacionados: MEV (Valor Máximo Extraível), Ataque Sandwich
Glossary Copilot

Faça perguntas de Solana com contexto aterrado sem sair do glossário.

Use contexto do glossário, relações entre termos, modelos mentais e builder paths para receber respostas estruturadas em vez de output genérico.

Explicar este código

Opcional: cole código Anchor, Solana ou Rust para o Copilot mapear primitivas de volta para termos do glossário.

Faça uma pergunta aterrada no glossário

Faça uma pergunta aterrada no glossário

O Copilot vai responder usando o termo atual, conceitos relacionados, modelos mentais e o grafo ao redor do glossário.

Grafo conceitual

Veja o termo como parte de uma rede, não como uma definição sem saída.

Esses ramos mostram quais conceitos esse termo toca diretamente e o que existe uma camada além deles.

Ramo

MEV (Valor Máximo Extraível)

The profit a block producer (leader) or sophisticated trader can extract by controlling the ordering, inclusion, or exclusion of transactions within a block — including strategies like front-running, back-running, sandwich attacks, and arbitrage. On Solana, MEV dynamics differ from Ethereum because there is no public mempool; transactions are forwarded directly to the current leader, making latency and validator relationships central to MEV capture. The Jito infrastructure provides the dominant MEV marketplace on Solana through bundles and tips.

Ramo

Ataque Sandwich

A form of MEV where an attacker places one transaction immediately before (front-run) and one immediately after (back-run) a victim's large AMM swap: the front-run buys the asset first, driving up the price the victim pays, and the back-run sells the asset immediately after the victim's transaction at the inflated price, extracting the difference as profit. On Solana, sandwich attacks are facilitated through Jito bundles, which allow searchers to atomically guarantee ordering of multiple transactions within a block. Victims can mitigate exposure by setting tight slippage tolerances (e.g., 0.1–0.5%) and using DEX aggregators that route across multiple pools to reduce single-pool price impact.

Próximos conceitos para explorar

Continue a cadeia de aprendizado em vez de parar em uma única definição.

Estes são os próximos conceitos que valem abrir se você quiser que este termo faça mais sentido dentro de um workflow real de Solana.

Rede

MEV (Valor Máximo Extraível)

The profit a block producer (leader) or sophisticated trader can extract by controlling the ordering, inclusion, or exclusion of transactions within a block — including strategies like front-running, back-running, sandwich attacks, and arbitrage. On Solana, MEV dynamics differ from Ethereum because there is no public mempool; transactions are forwarded directly to the current leader, making latency and validator relationships central to MEV capture. The Jito infrastructure provides the dominant MEV marketplace on Solana through bundles and tips.

Segurança

Ataque Sandwich

A form of MEV where an attacker places one transaction immediately before (front-run) and one immediately after (back-run) a victim's large AMM swap: the front-run buys the asset first, driving up the price the victim pays, and the back-run sells the asset immediately after the victim's transaction at the inflated price, extracting the difference as profit. On Solana, sandwich attacks are facilitated through Jito bundles, which allow searchers to atomically guarantee ordering of multiple transactions within a block. Victims can mitigate exposure by setting tight slippage tolerances (e.g., 0.1–0.5%) and using DEX aggregators that route across multiple pools to reduce single-pool price impact.

Segurança

Fuzzing (Trident)

An automated testing technique that generates pseudo-random, mutation-based, or coverage-guided instruction sequences and account inputs to discover crashes, panics, arithmetic errors, and invariant violations in Solana programs without requiring manually written test cases. Trident is the primary Solana-specific fuzzing framework, built on top of the Honggfuzz engine and the Anchor IDL, allowing developers to define instruction sequences and account state fuzzing harnesses that run thousands of iterations per second in a simulated runtime. Fuzzing complements manual audits by exhaustively exploring edge cases in instruction orderings and boundary values that reviewers may miss.

Segurança

Flash Loan Attack

An exploit where an attacker borrows a large amount of tokens via an uncollateralized flash loan, uses the borrowed funds to manipulate protocol state (typically distorting oracle prices or satisfying collateral requirements), extracts profit from the manipulated state, and repays the loan — all within a single atomic transaction. On Solana, flash loans are possible because transactions are atomic: if any instruction fails, the entire transaction reverts including the loan. Defenses include using time-weighted oracle prices, enforcing borrowing caps, and requiring multi-slot settlement.

Termos relacionados

Siga os conceitos que realmente dão contexto a este termo.

Entradas de glossário só ficam úteis quando estão conectadas. Esses links são o caminho mais curto para ideias adjacentes.

Redemev

MEV (Valor Máximo Extraível)

The profit a block producer (leader) or sophisticated trader can extract by controlling the ordering, inclusion, or exclusion of transactions within a block — including strategies like front-running, back-running, sandwich attacks, and arbitrage. On Solana, MEV dynamics differ from Ethereum because there is no public mempool; transactions are forwarded directly to the current leader, making latency and validator relationships central to MEV capture. The Jito infrastructure provides the dominant MEV marketplace on Solana through bundles and tips.

Segurançasandwich-attack

Ataque Sandwich

A form of MEV where an attacker places one transaction immediately before (front-run) and one immediately after (back-run) a victim's large AMM swap: the front-run buys the asset first, driving up the price the victim pays, and the back-run sells the asset immediately after the victim's transaction at the inflated price, extracting the difference as profit. On Solana, sandwich attacks are facilitated through Jito bundles, which allow searchers to atomically guarantee ordering of multiple transactions within a block. Victims can mitigate exposure by setting tight slippage tolerances (e.g., 0.1–0.5%) and using DEX aggregators that route across multiple pools to reduce single-pool price impact.

Mais na categoria

Permaneça na mesma camada e continue construindo contexto.

Essas entradas vivem ao lado do termo atual e ajudam a página a parecer parte de um grafo maior, não um beco sem saída.

Segurança

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Segurança

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Segurança

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Segurança

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.