Glossary OS

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A class of numerical vulnerability where integer division discards fractional remainders, causing systematic under-accounting of fees, interest, or token amounts that an attacker can exploit through repeated small transactions to drain protocol funds or receive more than entitled. Because Solana programs use integer arithmetic exclusively (no native floating point in on-chain code), division operations like amount / price always truncate toward zero, and protocols must decide whether to round in favor of the protocol (ceiling division for fees collected, floor division for tokens distributed) using formulas such as (numerator + denominator - 1) / denominator. Precision errors can also compound across fixed-point representations, so high-precision intermediate scaling (e.g., multiplying by 10^9 before dividing) is a common mitigation.

Modelo mental

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Piensa en esto como un bloque de construcción que conecta una definición aislada con el sistema mayor donde vive.

Contexto técnico

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Fallos, auditorías, superficies de ataque y patrones seguros.

Por qué le importa a un builder

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Precision Loss / Rounding Errors (precision-loss)
Categoría: Seguridad
Definición: A class of numerical vulnerability where integer division discards fractional remainders, causing systematic under-accounting of fees, interest, or token amounts that an attacker can exploit through repeated small transactions to drain protocol funds or receive more than entitled. Because Solana programs use integer arithmetic exclusively (no native floating point in on-chain code), division operations like amount / price always truncate toward zero, and protocols must decide whether to round in favor of the protocol (ceiling division for fees collected, floor division for tokens distributed) using formulas such as (numerator + denominator - 1) / denominator. Precision errors can also compound across fixed-point representations, so high-precision intermediate scaling (e.g., multiplying by 10^9 before dividing) is a common mitigation.
Relacionados: Desbordamiento de Entero

Glossary Copilot

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Usa contexto del glosario, relaciones entre términos, modelos mentales y builder paths para recibir respuestas estructuradas en vez de output genérico.

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Pregunta

Explicar este código

Opcional: pega código Anchor, Solana o Rust para que el Copilot mapee primitivas de vuelta al glosario.

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El Copilot responderá usando el término actual, conceptos relacionados, modelos mentales y el grafo alrededor del glosario.

Grafo conceptual

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Estas ramas muestran qué conceptos toca este término directamente y qué existe una capa más allá de ellos.

Rama

Desbordamiento de Entero

A class of arithmetic vulnerabilities where an integer computation produces a result outside the bounds of its fixed-width type, wrapping around silently in Rust's release builds (since Rust panics on overflow only in debug mode), yielding an incorrect value that can corrupt token balances, borrow limits, or access control counters. For example, subtracting a larger u64 from a smaller one wraps to near u64::MAX (~1.8 × 10^19), which could be interpreted as an enormous balance. Solana programs must use Rust's checked_add, checked_sub, checked_mul, and checked_div methods (or the saturating_* / wrapping_* variants with deliberate intent) on all financial arithmetic to eliminate this class of bugs.

Checked Math

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Siguientes conceptos para explorar

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Estos son los siguientes conceptos que vale la pena abrir si quieres que este término tenga más sentido dentro de un workflow real de Solana.

Seguridad

Desbordamiento de Entero

A class of arithmetic vulnerabilities where an integer computation produces a result outside the bounds of its fixed-width type, wrapping around silently in Rust's release builds (since Rust panics on overflow only in debug mode), yielding an incorrect value that can corrupt token balances, borrow limits, or access control counters. For example, subtracting a larger u64 from a smaller one wraps to near u64::MAX (~1.8 × 10^19), which could be interpreted as an enormous balance. Solana programs must use Rust's checked_add, checked_sub, checked_mul, and checked_div methods (or the saturating_* / wrapping_* variants with deliberate intent) on all financial arithmetic to eliminate this class of bugs.

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Seguridad

Privilege Escalation

A class of vulnerabilities where an attacker gains a higher level of authority than legitimately granted — for example, forging admin access, hijacking a program's upgrade authority, or obtaining a PDA signer without possessing the seeds that should gate it. On Solana, common vectors include missing signer checks (an account is treated as an authority without asserting is_signer), misconfigured multisig authority accounts, and upgrade authority mismanagement (leaving a program upgradeable by a hot wallet instead of a governance multisig or burning the upgrade authority entirely). Programs should enforce the principle of least privilege by using immutable upgrade authorities or time-locked governance for high-value programs.

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Seguridad

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.

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Seguridad

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

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Términos relacionados

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Seguridadinteger-overflow

Desbordamiento de Entero

A class of arithmetic vulnerabilities where an integer computation produces a result outside the bounds of its fixed-width type, wrapping around silently in Rust's release builds (since Rust panics on overflow only in debug mode), yielding an incorrect value that can corrupt token balances, borrow limits, or access control counters. For example, subtracting a larger u64 from a smaller one wraps to near u64::MAX (~1.8 × 10^19), which could be interpreted as an enormous balance. Solana programs must use Rust's checked_add, checked_sub, checked_mul, and checked_div methods (or the saturating_* / wrapping_* variants with deliberate intent) on all financial arithmetic to eliminate this class of bugs.

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Más en la categoría

Quédate en la misma capa y sigue construyendo contexto.

Estas entradas viven junto al término actual y ayudan a que la página se sienta parte de un grafo de conocimiento más amplio en lugar de un callejón sin salida.

Seguridad

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

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Seguridad

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

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Seguridad

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

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Seguridad

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.

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