Category of vulnerabilities where program authorization checks are insufficient or missing, allowing unauthorized users to execute privileged operations. Includes missing signer checks, owner checks, PDA validation, and constraint violations. The most common class of critical Solana program vulnerabilities.
Empieza por la explicación más corta y útil antes de profundizar.
Category of vulnerabilities where program authorization checks are insufficient or missing, allowing unauthorized users to execute privileged operations. Includes missing signer checks, owner checks, PDA validation, and constraint violations. The most common class of critical Solana program vulnerabilities.
Usa primero la analogía corta para razonar mejor sobre el término cuando aparezca en código, docs o prompts.
Piensa en esto como un bloque de construcción que conecta una definición aislada con el sistema mayor donde vive.
Ubica el término dentro de la capa de Solana en la que vive para razonar mejor sobre él.
Fallos, auditorías, superficies de ataque y patrones seguros.
Convierte el término de vocabulario en algo operacional para producto e ingeniería.
Este término desbloquea conceptos adyacentes rápido, así que funciona mejor cuando lo tratas como un punto de conexión y no como una definición aislada.
Usa este bloque compacto cuando quieras dar contexto sólido a un agente o asistente sin volcar toda la página.
Access Control Bypass (access-control-bypass) Categoría: Seguridad Definición: Category of vulnerabilities where program authorization checks are insufficient or missing, allowing unauthorized users to execute privileged operations. Includes missing signer checks, owner checks, PDA validation, and constraint violations. The most common class of critical Solana program vulnerabilities. Relacionados: Missing Signer Check, Missing Owner Check, Privilege Escalation
Usa contexto del glosario, relaciones entre términos, modelos mentales y builder paths para recibir respuestas estructuradas en vez de output genérico.
Opcional: pega código Anchor, Solana o Rust para que el Copilot mapee primitivas de vuelta al glosario.
El Copilot responderá usando el término actual, conceptos relacionados, modelos mentales y el grafo alrededor del glosario.
Estas ramas muestran qué conceptos toca este término directamente y qué existe una capa más allá de ellos.
A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.
A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.
A class of vulnerabilities where an attacker gains a higher level of authority than legitimately granted — for example, forging admin access, hijacking a program's upgrade authority, or obtaining a PDA signer without possessing the seeds that should gate it. On Solana, common vectors include missing signer checks (an account is treated as an authority without asserting is_signer), misconfigured multisig authority accounts, and upgrade authority mismanagement (leaving a program upgradeable by a hot wallet instead of a governance multisig or burning the upgrade authority entirely). Programs should enforce the principle of least privilege by using immutable upgrade authorities or time-locked governance for high-value programs.
Estos son los siguientes conceptos que vale la pena abrir si quieres que este término tenga más sentido dentro de un workflow real de Solana.
Las entradas del glosario se vuelven útiles cuando están conectadas. Estos enlaces son el camino más corto hacia ideas adyacentes.
A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.
A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.
A class of vulnerabilities where an attacker gains a higher level of authority than legitimately granted — for example, forging admin access, hijacking a program's upgrade authority, or obtaining a PDA signer without possessing the seeds that should gate it. On Solana, common vectors include missing signer checks (an account is treated as an authority without asserting is_signer), misconfigured multisig authority accounts, and upgrade authority mismanagement (leaving a program upgradeable by a hot wallet instead of a governance multisig or burning the upgrade authority entirely). Programs should enforce the principle of least privilege by using immutable upgrade authorities or time-locked governance for high-value programs.
Estas entradas viven junto al término actual y ayudan a que la página se sienta parte de un grafo de conocimiento más amplio en lugar de un callejón sin salida.
A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.
A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.
A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.
A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.