Security

Stateful Fuzzing

An advanced fuzzing technique that maintains program state across iterations, generating sequences of instructions rather than individual random inputs. Stateful fuzzing can discover vulnerabilities that only manifest after specific sequences of operations, such as a withdraw-after-close or a double-init attack. Trident implements stateful fuzzing for Solana programs by maintaining a simulated runtime state and generating random instruction sequences with valid account configurations derived from the program's Anchor IDL.

IDstateful-fuzzing

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An advanced fuzzing technique that maintains program state across iterations, generating sequences of instructions rather than individual random inputs. Stateful fuzzing can discover vulnerabilities that only manifest after specific sequences of operations, such as a withdraw-after-close or a double-init attack. Trident implements stateful fuzzing for Solana programs by maintaining a simulated runtime state and generating random instruction sequences with valid account configurations derived from the program's Anchor IDL.

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Stateful Fuzzing (stateful-fuzzing)
Category: Security
Definition: An advanced fuzzing technique that maintains program state across iterations, generating sequences of instructions rather than individual random inputs. Stateful fuzzing can discover vulnerabilities that only manifest after specific sequences of operations, such as a withdraw-after-close or a double-init attack. Trident implements stateful fuzzing for Solana programs by maintaining a simulated runtime state and generating random instruction sequences with valid account configurations derived from the program's Anchor IDL.
Related: Fuzzing (Trident), Trident (Fuzzer), Invariant Testing
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Branch

Fuzzing (Trident)

An automated testing technique that generates pseudo-random, mutation-based, or coverage-guided instruction sequences and account inputs to discover crashes, panics, arithmetic errors, and invariant violations in Solana programs without requiring manually written test cases. Trident is the primary Solana-specific fuzzing framework, built on top of the Honggfuzz engine and the Anchor IDL, allowing developers to define instruction sequences and account state fuzzing harnesses that run thousands of iterations per second in a simulated runtime. Fuzzing complements manual audits by exhaustively exploring edge cases in instruction orderings and boundary values that reviewers may miss.

Branch

Trident (Fuzzer)

A fuzz testing framework for Solana programs built on Honggfuzz. Trident generates random instruction sequences and account states to discover edge cases and vulnerabilities. It integrates with Anchor programs and can detect common bugs like integer overflows, unauthorized access, and invalid state transitions. Developed by Ackee Blockchain Security.

Branch

Invariant Testing

A property-based testing approach where developers define invariants (properties that must always hold true) and a fuzzer generates random sequences of function calls attempting to violate them. Unlike unit tests that check specific scenarios, invariant tests explore the state space stochastically. Tools like Foundry invariant testing, Echidna, and Medusa support this approach.

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Security

Fuzzing (Trident)

An automated testing technique that generates pseudo-random, mutation-based, or coverage-guided instruction sequences and account inputs to discover crashes, panics, arithmetic errors, and invariant violations in Solana programs without requiring manually written test cases. Trident is the primary Solana-specific fuzzing framework, built on top of the Honggfuzz engine and the Anchor IDL, allowing developers to define instruction sequences and account state fuzzing harnesses that run thousands of iterations per second in a simulated runtime. Fuzzing complements manual audits by exhaustively exploring edge cases in instruction orderings and boundary values that reviewers may miss.

Developer Tools

Trident (Fuzzer)

A fuzz testing framework for Solana programs built on Honggfuzz. Trident generates random instruction sequences and account states to discover edge cases and vulnerabilities. It integrates with Anchor programs and can detect common bugs like integer overflows, unauthorized access, and invalid state transitions. Developed by Ackee Blockchain Security.

Developer Tools

Invariant Testing

A property-based testing approach where developers define invariants (properties that must always hold true) and a fuzzer generates random sequences of function calls attempting to violate them. Unlike unit tests that check specific scenarios, invariant tests explore the state space stochastically. Tools like Foundry invariant testing, Echidna, and Medusa support this approach.

Security

Sysvar Spoofing

A vulnerability where a program retrieves a sysvar (such as Clock, Rent, or SlotHashes) by deserializing an account passed in the instruction's account list rather than using the runtime's native sysvar access API, allowing an attacker to substitute a fake account at the well-known sysvar address with crafted data — for example, a manipulated clock timestamp to bypass time locks. The safe pattern in modern Solana programs is to use Clock::get(), Rent::get(), and equivalent intrinsics that read from the runtime directly without trusting any account; Anchor's Sysvar<'info, Clock> account type validates the address but native programs should prefer the get() API.

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Securityfuzzing

Fuzzing (Trident)

An automated testing technique that generates pseudo-random, mutation-based, or coverage-guided instruction sequences and account inputs to discover crashes, panics, arithmetic errors, and invariant violations in Solana programs without requiring manually written test cases. Trident is the primary Solana-specific fuzzing framework, built on top of the Honggfuzz engine and the Anchor IDL, allowing developers to define instruction sequences and account state fuzzing harnesses that run thousands of iterations per second in a simulated runtime. Fuzzing complements manual audits by exhaustively exploring edge cases in instruction orderings and boundary values that reviewers may miss.

Related terms

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Securityfuzzing

Fuzzing (Trident)

An automated testing technique that generates pseudo-random, mutation-based, or coverage-guided instruction sequences and account inputs to discover crashes, panics, arithmetic errors, and invariant violations in Solana programs without requiring manually written test cases. Trident is the primary Solana-specific fuzzing framework, built on top of the Honggfuzz engine and the Anchor IDL, allowing developers to define instruction sequences and account state fuzzing harnesses that run thousands of iterations per second in a simulated runtime. Fuzzing complements manual audits by exhaustively exploring edge cases in instruction orderings and boundary values that reviewers may miss.

Developer Toolstrident

Trident (Fuzzer)

A fuzz testing framework for Solana programs built on Honggfuzz. Trident generates random instruction sequences and account states to discover edge cases and vulnerabilities. It integrates with Anchor programs and can detect common bugs like integer overflows, unauthorized access, and invalid state transitions. Developed by Ackee Blockchain Security.

Developer Toolsinvariant-testing

Invariant Testing

A property-based testing approach where developers define invariants (properties that must always hold true) and a fuzzer generates random sequences of function calls attempting to violate them. Unlike unit tests that check specific scenarios, invariant tests explore the state space stochastically. Tools like Foundry invariant testing, Echidna, and Medusa support this approach.

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Security

Missing Signer Check

A vulnerability where a program accepts an account in a privileged role (e.g., admin, authority, payer) without verifying that the account actually signed the transaction, allowing any caller to impersonate that authority by simply passing the target pubkey as an instruction account. In native Solana programs, the check requires asserting account.is_signer == true; in Anchor, the Signer<'info> type enforces this automatically. Exploitation lets an attacker bypass all access control gated on authority equality checks, making it one of the most critical and commonly audited vulnerabilities in Solana programs.

Security

Missing Owner Check

A vulnerability where a program deserializes and trusts account data without first confirming that the account is owned by the expected program, allowing an attacker to substitute a maliciously crafted account owned by a different program whose byte layout happens to satisfy the deserialization. On Solana, every account stores a 32-byte owner field set to the program that created it; native programs must assert account.owner == &expected_program_id, while Anchor's Account<'info, T> wrapper performs this check automatically. Failure to validate ownership can lead to complete auth bypass if an attacker can construct a fake account whose data parses into a struct with elevated privileges.

Security

Arbitrary CPI

A vulnerability where a program accepts an arbitrary program account from the caller and invokes it via Cross-Program Invocation (CPI) without verifying it matches a known, trusted program ID, effectively letting an attacker substitute a malicious program that executes under the victim program's authority or manipulates accounts the victim program passes to it. A common pattern is accepting a token_program account without checking it equals spl_token::ID, so the attacker passes a lookalike program that records or drains account data. Prevention requires hard-coding or explicitly checking the program ID before every CPI call.

Security

PDA Substitution Attack

A vulnerability where a program derives a PDA internally but accepts an externally supplied account as that PDA without re-deriving and comparing the address, allowing an attacker to pass a different PDA (derived from attacker-controlled seeds) that the program will treat as legitimate. Because PDAs are deterministic, the only way to guarantee account identity is to call Pubkey::find_program_address (or equivalent) with the expected seeds inside the program and assert the result equals the supplied key. Anchor's seeds and bump constraints on the Account type automate this re-derivation and equality check.